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1. Introduction
There were four papers presented at the 2007
Information for Better Markets Conference on
Intangibles and Research. Basu and Waymire
(2008) express extreme scepticism as to whether
balance sheet recognition of intangibles is possi-
ble. Their argument, at least in part, is that intangi-
bles are not separable from tangible assets.
Further, the value of intangible assets, whether
singly or in combination, is best judged by empha-
sising the forecasting of future profit streams, as
opposed to explicit balance sheet recognition. As
stated by the authors, ‘[v]aluing accounting intan-
gibles on a stand-alone basis requires heroic as-
sumptions about separability, highly uncertain
estimates of ambiguous future benefits, and arbi-
trary allocations of jointly produced income.’
Further, intangible assets, when assessed at the
macro-level for countries, are linked to govern-
ment policies with respect to activities such as ed-
ucation and, as a consequence, it is difficult to
identify them with specific firms.
Skinner (2008) evaluates policy proposals and
concludes that private incentives to disclose infor-
mation about intangibles, over and above that dis-
closed in the US, are the best solution, with
regulators, at best, providing guidance as to the
forms that these disclosures could take. This is
based upon an analysis that critically evaluates
whether current US accounting can be associated
with the claimed difficulties in the US (e.g. under
investment, difficulties in raising capital, etc., pri-
marily related to technology firms and research
and development (R&D)) – he argues it cannot.
Wyatt (2008) provides an extremely comprehen-
sive analysis of the associations between financial
and non-financial information on various types of
intangibles and market value or returns (a real boon
to academics!) – the work surveyed is global, 
although much of it emanates from the US. Whilst
making recommendations for future research, she
suggests, amongst others, that regulators might do
better if more discretion were given to managers to
recognise intangible assets (as in the UK and
Australia prior to IAS adoption). She also suggests
that disclosures could be enhanced to include more
broad categories of expenditure.
Ittner (2008) considers whether internal measure-
ment systems for intangibles, primarily for reward
and performance evaluation purposes, are associat-
ed with superior performance. He finds some evi-
dence that the measurement systems are associated
with superior performance – including stock mar-
ket performance – but little evidence about particu-
lar measures. His review suggests the complexity
of business models within which wealth generation
is achieved via expenditures on activities thought
to have the potential to generate intangible assets.
Overall, the contents of the four papers suggest
little reason to fundamentally change recognition
practices, although arguments for small changes at
the margin could be made (i.e. the allowing of dis-
cretion with respect to categories of development
expenditures). Arguments are put forward for en-
hanced disclosure requirements with respect to
items such as advertising expenditures. Voluntary
disclosure mechanisms are seen as the most viable
mechanisms for disclosures relevant to under-
standing the wealth creation possibilities of expen-
ditures on potential intangible assets, if only
because of the complexity and heterogeneity of the
business models within which such activities are
set. In this context, an argument could be made for
accounting standard setters to provide general
frameworks within which such voluntary disclo-
sures can be made. Because much (but not all) of
the evidence and arguments in the papers present-
ed comes from the US, I will focus on the UK, par-
ticularly UK evidence that is available, and
applying some of the arguments and recommenda-
tions to the UK. I will also focus on financial re-
porting and mandatory and voluntary disclosure
possibilities and practices.
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2. Accounting for R&D expenditures
2.1. Observations on the history of accounting 
for R&D expenditures in the UK and the views 
of analysts and company accountants
It is illuminating to consider the history of ac-
counting for R&D expenditures in the UK. Hope
and Gray (1982) provide an illustration of the 
deliberations surrounding the introduction of
SSAP 13 Accounting for Research and Develop-
ment (ASC, 1977). In the UK, the initial standard
was developed through a process involving two
similarly titled exposure drafts, namely ED 14
(ASC 1975) and ED 17 (ASC 1976), resulting in
SSAP 13 (ASC 1977).
During the process of development of the final
standard, the recommended treatment evolved
from: (i) requiring the immediate expensing of all
R&D expenditures (ED 14); to (ii) the immediate
expensing of all research expenditures plus the
mandatory capitalisation and subsequent amortisa-
tion of development expenditures which satisfy
certain criteria, with the immediate expensing of
all other development expenditures (ED 17); to
(iii) the immediate expensing of all research ex-
penditures plus the optional capitalisation and sub-
sequent amortisation of some development
expenditures which satisfy certain criteria, with
the immediate expensing of all other development
expenditures (SSAP 13). Further, the issue of dis-
closure evolved from the disclosure of R&D ex-
penditures (ED 14) to the disclosure of the amount
carried forward, plus the balance and movement
on the deferred R&D account (ED 17 and SSAP
13). Hope and Gray (1982) point out that this evo-
lution was occurring at a time when it seemed
clear that most UK firms (93%) immediately ex-
pensed all R&D expenditures.
Hope and Gray (1982) provide a discussion of
why the standard evolved, relative to the respons-
es received from interested parties to the two ex-
posure drafts. With respect to ED 14, most
respondents did not object to the immediate write-
off of all R&D expenditures. Some firms proposed
that some capitalisation of development expendi-
tures should be allowed – but the motive for such
a view mainly concerned the way in which gov-
ernment contracts worked in the aerospace indus-
try. Some of the professional firms responding
supported this latter view on the grounds of the
matching principle.
When ED 17 responded to these concerns, by
making the capitalisation of qualifying develop-
ment expenditures mandatory, some companies
expressed concern that this requirement should be
mandatory, arguing instead that it should be op-
tional. Nonetheless, some argued that allowing any
form of capitalisation constituted a retrograde step
in that it would produce an accounting for R&D
expenditures out of step with other international
standards. The voluntary capitalisers won the ar-
gument, producing the voluntary capitalisation op-
tion in SSAP 13.
With respect to disclosures regarding R&D ex-
penditures, there was more objection at the ED14
stage to the requirement to disclose R&D expendi-
tures. Hope and Gray (1982) identify eight corre-
spondents commenting unfavourably. The common
view amongst these respondents was ‘… that any-
thing other that extensive disclosure of (e.g.) indi-
vidual project expenditures and estimated success
rates of projects, would be misleading to users of
accounts. Their reason for not allowing extensive
disclosure included, inter alia, problems of defini-
tion, comparability, materiality, and advantage to
competitors’ (Hope and Gray, 1982: 544–545).
When ED 17 eliminated the requirement to dis-
close R&D expenditures, only one accounting
firm, and the Department of Industry, objected.
Eventually, SSAP13 was revised to recommend
the disclosure of R&D expenditures, for firms
meeting certain size thresholds, but only in 1989.
Stoneman and Toivanen (2001) analyse the impact
of the revision of SSAP 13 on the disclosure of
R&D expenditures by UK public companies. Their
analysis suggests that the revision of SSAP 13 
produced a large increase in the disclosure of 
R&D expenditures across all classes of firms.
Nonetheless, by the end of the period they study
(1994), their results suggest that only about 50%
of firms were disclosing R&D expenditures.
Subsequent to the development of SSAP 13, and
its revision, Goodacre and McGrath (1997) inves-
tigate whether UK analysts demonstrate myopic
behaviour with respect to the treatment of R&D
expenditures. Via an experimental study, their evi-
dence suggests that analysts are not misled by the
immediate expensing of R&D expenditures. The
authors conclude that their results suggest ‘ana-
lysts recognise the long term importance of R&D
investment and are not myopic in this respect.’
Their study also invited analysts taking part in the
experiment to comment upon the accounting treat-
ment of R&D expenditures. The authors report one
characteristic quotation which states ‘I believe
R&D should be written off as it is incurred …
there is no certainty that development will lead to
a … return on investment … There is even less
certainty that basic research will. Writing off R&D
… does not allow for any value judgements … by
top management with a vested interest.’
Nixon (1997) surveys the views of company ac-
countants about the accounting treatment of R&D
expenditures. Of the accountants surveyed, the vast
majority of their companies immediately wrote off
all R&D expenditures. Further, the bulk of respon-
dents did not believe that this accounting treatment
had any adverse economic consequences, in terms
of their companies’ market values or ability to raise
276 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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finance. Finally, Nixon (1997) states that, for the
respondents, ‘disclosure of information is the key
factor determining the value the capital markets at-
tribute to a company’s R&D expenditure rather
than its treatment; the tension between the accruals
and prudence concepts that pre-occupy the ac-
counting standard-setters is … of little relevance to
their R&D accounting.’ Interestingly, the respon-
dents also suggested that much of this disclosure
occurred outside of the regular financial statements
via meetings with analysts and institutional in-
vestors, although many companies provided fairly
detailed, objective, and verifiable, descriptions of
their R&D activities outside the audited parts of
their financial statements
Overall, the history of the development of UK
standards for the recognition and disclosure of
R&D expenditure suggests that there was no enor-
mous demand for any treatment other than imme-
diate expensing. Certainly, there was no demand
for any widespread capitalisation of research ex-
penditures. Further, although the situation evolved
to incorporate the mandatory disclosure of R&D
expenditures, some concerns were expressed as to
whether a single number was likely to be informa-
tive without further details of the particular proj-
ects being pursued and the likelihood of their
success. Further, issues of confidentiality and as-
sociated likelihood of proprietary costs were
raised with respect to disclosure.
Subsequent work does not alter the view above
with respect to accounting for R&D expenditures.
Judging from Goodacre and McGrath (1997) and
Nixon (1997), little demand exists from analysts or
companies for the capitalisation of R&D expendi-
tures. Companies do not believe that there are ad-
verse consequences associated with the immediate
write-off of R&D expenditures. What might have
changed between the gestation period of SSAP 13
and now is the attitude towards disclosure about
the nature of R&D activities, whether in the finan-
cial statements or outwith. Company accountants
now see this as the main method via which the
capital markets recognise the value of R&D activ-
ities.
2.2. The value relevance of R&D expense in the
UK
A number of studies have reported on the asso-
ciation between R&D expense and market values
in the UK, whether that association was the focus
of the paper or not. The earliest paper in this num-
ber is Green et al. (1996). They collect data on UK
listed firms for 1990, 1991 and 1992 reporting
R&D expense, with sample sizes of 190 firms in
1990, 232 in 1991, and 240 in 1992. They estimate
the following basic equation:
MV – BV = α0 + α1BV + βRI + γRD + ε (1)
where:
MV is market value of the firm, measured six
months after the financial year-end;
BV is closing book value;
RI is residual income associated with the tan-
gible assets of the firm, measured as profits
before exceptional and extraordinary items
plus R&D expenditures less the product of
the firm cost of capital multiplied by open-
ing book value;
RD is R&D expense; and
ε is a mean zero random variable.
Equation (1) is estimating in deflated form,
using book value as the deflator, and with a num-
ber of control variables added in after deflation
(firm market share, annual concentration ratio for
the firm’s industry, firm debt ratio, average annual
industry debt ratio, the square of the difference be-
tween the firm and the average annual industry
debt ratio, annual firm return volatility).
Effectively, their model suggests that the excess
of market over book value can be captured as the
sum of a multiple of book value, capitalised resid-
ual income, R&D capital (expressed as a multiple
of current R&D expense, because of the persist-
ence in R&D expense – as in, for example,
Hirschey and Weygandt, 1985), and the effects of
the control variables.
The results are not totally convincing with re-
spect to the value relevance of R&D expenditures.
In the annual regressions, the coefficient of R&D
expense is only positive and significantly different
from zero, using heteroscedasticity-adjusted stan-
dard errors, and at the 5% level of significance, for
1991 – for 1990 and 1992, it is positive and sig-
nificant at the 10% level.1 When extreme values
are removed, the coefficients of R&D expense are
positive but barely significant, even at the 10%
level. When the data is pooled across years (with
or without extreme values), or rank regressions (a
form of robust regression) are run on the annual or
pooled data, or weighted least squares techniques
are used on the undeflated version of equation (1),
the coefficient of R&D expense is positive and sig-
nificant at the 5% level. The overall conclusion
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 277
1 Strictly speaking, given that Green et al. (1996) add RD
expense back to earnings before creating residual income, the
appropriate test for value relevance could be argued to be not
whether the coefficient of RD is significantly different from
zero but rather whether that coefficient equalled the negative
of the coefficient for RI. Were that test not to be rejected, it
would imply that the RI and RD terms could be amalgamated
into (RI-RD) without any loss of explanatory power. Given
that the coefficient RI is significantly positive and sometimes
below and sometimes above that for RD for all estimates, op-
erating the suggested value relevance test might have pro-
duced significant results. Nonetheless, the emphasis in Green
et al. (1996) was on the market (intangible asset) valuation of
RD, not the value relevance of RD expense.
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reached by Green et al. (1996: 210) is that ‘… it
would be difficult to accuse the market of totally
ignoring the value-relevance of past research and
development expenditures that are yet to have an
effect on earnings’ – not necessarily the most ring-
ing endorsement of the value relevance of R&D
expense (as pointed out by Wyatt, 2008).
Stronger evidence, however, is provided by
Stark and Thomas (1998) who, although not fo-
cussing on the value relevance of R&D expense,
nonetheless effectively update Green et al. (1996).
The fullest model they estimate is represented by
the following equation:2
MV = α0 + α1BV + β(E + RD) + γRD (2)
+ δLBV + ε
where:
E is profits before exceptional and extraordi-
nary items; and
LBV is opening book value.
This specification ignores the control variables
in Green et al. (1996), which added relatively little
to explanatory power in that study. Rather than
using the residual income variable of Green et al.
(1996), equation (2) can be viewed as splitting it
up into its components – earnings before excep-
tional and extraordinary items, with R&D expense
added back, and opening book value times the cost
of capital. Effectively, then, equation (2) is an un-
constrained version of equation (1) if the firm cost
of capital can be treated as a constant across
firms.3
To estimate equation (2), annual cross-sections
are constructed for 1990 to 1994. Unlike Green et
al. (1996), the annual samples are not restricted to
only firms reporting R&D expense. The results are
much more positive in favour of the value rele-
vance of R&D expense, with the coefficients on all
the annual cross-sections and the pooled data
being positive and significant at the 5% level.
Further, the actual increases in explanatory power
associated with the addition of R&D expense into
the firm value equation are sizeable enough to be
noticed not merely statistically.
Finally, Akbar and Stark (2003) provide the most
recent and comprehensive evidence for the UK.
Like Stark and Thomas (1998), the focus of this
paper is not on the value relevance of R&D ex-
pense. Akbar and Stark (2003) include it in their
regressions as a control variable because, in their
view, the two studies described above established
a case for the value relevance of R&D expense. As
a consequence, to increase the power of their tests
with respects to the value relevance of the vari-
ables they were concerned about (dividends and
capital contributions), R&D expense should be in-
cluded as a control variable. Using all non-finan-
cial firm-years for which relevant data is available
from 1990 to 2001, the fullest model they estimate
is as below:
MV = α0 + α1BV + βRI + γRD + δD (3)
+ ςCC + ηOI + ε
where:
D is dividends declared;
CC is capital contributions; and
OI is an estimate of the Ohlson (1989) concept
of ‘other information’.
Equation (3) is estimated using four deflators –
book value, number of shares, sales and opening
market value. Estimates of the coefficient of R&D
from pooling all the data are significant for all de-
flators.4 Although the results for the annual cross-
sections are not provided, footnote 8 (Akbar and
Stark, 2003: 1232) of the paper suggests that these
results almost invariably provide positive and sig-
nificant coefficient estimates for R&D estimates,
as do the coefficients reported for R&D expense
for the pooled samples. They conclude (again from
their footnote 8) that their ‘… results add further
weight to the view that, on average, the capital
markets treat research and development expendi-
tures as investments in long-lived assets.’
Overall, the UK stream of work providing evi-
dence on value-relevance has developed over time
in three ways. First, the number of years has in-
creased. Second, the models estimated have ex-
panded to include more, or alternative, possible
control variables. As a consequence of both these
points, the power of the tests has increased. Third,
the estimation methods have expanded to include
more deflators. And, over the course of this devel-
opment, the evidence in favour of the value rele-
vance of R&D expense has become stronger.5,6
278 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 For the sake of comparability with Green et al. (1996), I
use different notation from that found in Stark and Thomas
(1998).
3 Rather than the firm-specific cost of capital used in Green
et al. (1996).
4 Akbar and Stark (2003) used a number of different defla-
tors because of the debate which exists as to the appropriate
deflator to use in value-relevance studies (for a recent and
comprehensive contribution to this debate, see Barth and
Clinch, 2007).
5 Shah et al. (2008a) also provide evidence which is consis-
tent with the idea that market participants discriminate be-
tween sectors in the valuation of R&D activities.
6 A different literature, based in (industrial) economics, re-
lates R&D expenditures and other measures of innovation to
the market values of firms. See Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006)
for a relatively current example of this literature and a source
of useful references. One key difference between this litera-
ture and that in accounting and finance is that the valuation
models tend to be estimated in a form that is non-linear in the
underlying variables, versus the assumed linearity in the ac-
counting and finance literature. As a consequence, it is not
clear that the results from this literature are strictly compara-
ble with those drawn from the literature in accounting and fi-
nance.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:44
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
Nonetheless, as indicated in the previous sec-
tion, the value-relevance of R&D expense is un-
likely to be purely a consequence of reporting that
single number. Instead, the association between
R&D expense and market prices emerges through
a disclosure process, whether via the financial
statements, or via other means, such as company
and other meetings with analysts and institutional
investors.
2.3. The use of discretion in capitalising 
development expenditure in the UK
Green et al. (1996: 201) argue that it was rare for
capitalised R&D to appear in the balance sheets of
UK listed firms. This conclusion was based upon
the availability of data in Datastream for capi-
talised R&D for UK firms. Nonetheless, their con-
clusion was incorrect. As pointed out above, the
revised version of SSAP 13, issued in 1989, did
allow firms the discretion, but not the compulsion,
to capitalise development expenditures under cer-
tain conditions (similar to those in the current IAS
for the mandatory capitalising of certain develop-
ment expenditures). Further, footnote disclosure
was then available about the extent of the capitali-
sation of development expenditures. This footnote
disclosure was rarely picked up by Datastream.
Oswald (2008) studies how the choice of capi-
talising versus expensing is associated with the
value-relevance of book value and earnings.7 He
does so in a number of ways, but in describing the
study I will concentrate on the aspect of the
methodology that uses valuation models. He does
so by comparing the explanatory power of two
models of the firm. The first model is:
MV = α0 + α1BV + βE + ε (4a)
The second model adjusts BV and E to reflect
what they would have been if the alternative pos-
sible treatment of development expenditures had
been adopted. Therefore, if the firm-year observa-
tion is for a firm that is an ‘expenser’, BV and E
are estimated ‘as if’ some capitalisation had oc-
curred. If the firm-year observation is for a firm
that is a ‘capitaliser’, BV and E are estimated ‘as
if’ R&D expenditures are expensed. Therefore, the
second model estimated is:
MV = α0 + α1BVadj + βEadj + ε (4b)
where:
BVadj is adjusted book value; and
Eadj is adjusted earnings
Equations (4a) and (4b) are then compared for
explanatory power for ‘expensers’ and ‘capitalis-
ers’, the equations having been deflated by open-
ing market value. Oswald’s (2008) results suggest
that firms’ exercise of discretion over the account-
ing treatment of development expenditures are
consistent with the notion that firms acted to in-
crease the value relevance of earnings and book
value. More specifically, equation (4a) has more
explanatory power relative to equation (4b) for
both the ‘expenser’ and ‘capitaliser’ sub-samples.8
There are a number of points that can be raised
with respect to this study. First, it supports the no-
tion that the IAS, in removing discretion over the
treatment of development expenditures, remove a
useful way for firms to communicate information
to the stock markets. Further, it accords with the
evidence discussed in Wyatt (2008) for Australia.
We might conclude that, although the IAS solution
might be purer in accounting terms, purity of ac-
counting might not be an absolute informational
virtue. Further, Nixon (1997) argues that one rea-
son why many UK firms did not use the discretion
allowed to capitalise and amortise some of their
qualifying development expenditures is that to so
do requires a reasonably substantial amount of
work, both in terms of identifying expenditures for
different R&D projects and in terms of then apply-
ing the rules.
Second, evidence in Oswald (2008), nonethe-
less, suggests that this discretion was exercised by
a relatively small number of UK firms, and fea-
tured in a relatively small number of the firm-year
observations. Specifically, Oswald’s (2008) sam-
ple features 3,229 firm-years drawn from the peri-
od 1996 to 2004. Of these, he identifies 468
‘capitaliser’ firm-years, approximately 14.5% of
the sample. This is consistent with the evidence in
Nixon (1997). As a consequence, the withdrawal
of discretion, as a practical matter, might not have
too drastic an effect on the efficient operation of
the UK stock market.
Third, there are the limits on the interpretations
that can be placed on studies such as that of
Oswald (2008). Ignoring the processes identified
above via which the market attributes value to
R&D activities, in particular, the study has partic-
ular resonance if it is believed that investors only
concentrate on book value and earnings – and 
ignore all the other information that typical finan-
cial statements for listed UK (or elsewhere) com-
panies contain, both financial and non-financial.
Nonetheless, in the light of evidence that, indeed,
market values can, and should, be explained by
rather more informational variables than book
value and earnings (in particular, R&D expense), it
is not at all clear that such a belief is rational. As a
consequence, we might want to know more about
the impact of the exercise of discretion on the in-
formation content of the totality of the affected
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 279
7 Oswald (2008) also studies the determinants of the choice
between capitalisation and expensing.
8 As with Akbar and Stark (2003), Oswald (2008) investi-
gates the sensitivity of his results to alternative deflators.
Generally, his results are not sensitive to the choice of deflator.
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disclosures, not merely book value and earnings.
These observations, however, should not be in-
terpreted as a criticism of Oswald (2008) alone.
More, they should be interpreted as commenting
on a general line of research in which, counter-fac-
tually, only certain accounting aggregates (e.g.
book value and earnings) are apparently consid-
ered value-relevant in considering competing 
accounting treatments or changes in the value 
relevance of ‘accounting’ over time.
2.4. Is there evidence that R&D firms are 
mispriced in the UK?
Skinner (2008) asks whether there is any evi-
dence that the form of accounting for R&D 
expenditures systematically misleads markets. 
Al-Horani et al. (2003) provide evidence on this
issue. Underlying their investigation is the intu-
ition that, if capital markets recognise the econom-
ic value of R&D activities, this recognition will be
built into the market values of firms. As a conse-
quence, ceteris paribus, the extent and value of
R&D activities will be associated with the book-
to-market (BM) ratio of firms, and the well-known
BM effect, whereby high (low) BM firms tend to
earn high (low) returns could be, at least partially,
associated with R&D activities.
Al-Horani et al. (2003) use a sample of UK firms
covering the years from 1990 to 1999. First, they
split these firms up into those reporting R&D ex-
pense and those not. On average, just over 300
firms a year reported positive R&D expense. The
R&D firms are then ranked by the ratio of R&D
expense to firm equity market value (RD/ME) and
formed into quintile portfolios. Al-Horani et al.
(2003) observe that the lowest quintile R&D firms,
as measured by RD/ME, have the lowest average
annual returns, with average annual returns in-
creasing as the quintile portfolios move from low
to high RD/ME. Nonetheless, firms reporting
R&D expense do not automatically have higher re-
turns than non-R&D firms – the average annual re-
turn for non-R&D firms is higher than the average
annual returns for the lowest three quintiles. These
results are similar to those observed by Chan et al.
(2001) in the USA. Further, when standard Fama-
MacBeth (1973) tests involving monthly cross-
sectional regressions are performed, in which firm
monthly returns are regressed on firm size (market
value), BM and RD/ME and the average coeffi-
cient for each independent variable calculated and
tested against the null hypothesis that it is zero, the
only variable that has a significant cross-sectional
relationship with returns over the period is
RD/ME.
These results can be interpreted in a number of
ways. First, they appear to support the Al-Horani
et al. (2003) intuition that the relationship of re-
turns to BM is related to R&D activities.9,10
Second, either RD/ME captures a priced risk fac-
tor or the positive relationship between RD/ME
and returns signals under-pricing in which, in par-
ticular, high RD/ME firms are the most under-
priced – even if the lowest three quintiles of
RD/ME firms have lower average returns than
non-R&D firms. Is there a possible explanation,
however, that can justify the assertion that the pos-
itive relationship is a result of risk?
Consider the following possibility.11 First, R&D
activity buys real (call) options – the opportunity
to invest in the production of some new good or
service. R&D activity is part of the new product
development process. Second, for a fixed BM
ratio, combined with a further assumption that
R&D programmes are relatively steady and,
hence, R&D capital can be adequately proxied by
R&D expense,12 what is the implication of RD/ME
increasing? The implication is that each pound of
R&D activity is being less highly valued by stock
market participants. Given that R&D activity is
being valued like a call option, the higher the
RD/ME, the less ‘in-the-money’ are the real op-
tions ‘purchased’ as a consequence of the R&D ac-
tivities. Options theory suggests that the less 
in-the-money an option is, the higher will be its
expected return, resulting in, ceteris paribus, a
positive relationship between RD/ME and expect-
ed returns. As a consequence, it can be argued that
there is a risk story that can explain the positive re-
lationship between RD/ME and returns.13
3. Accounting for other intangible assets
Other expenditures could give rise to intangible as-
sets. As indicated in Wyatt (2008), these expendi-
tures could include expenditures on marketing
and, in particular, advertising, and human capital
development. In the UK, the accounting treatment
280 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
9 Additional robustness tests suggest that it is credible to
claim that there is both a BM and a RD/ME effect in the UK.
There is little evidence, for the period studied, of a size (ME)
effect.
10 Al-Horani et al. (2003) also find that adding in a RD ‘fac-
tor’, related to the difference between returns for R&D firms
and returns for non-R&D firms, improves the explanatory
power of the Fama-French three factor model in the UK.
11 The explanation is attributable to my colleagues Ala’a 
Al-Horani and Peter Pope as much as to me. It was contained
in pre-publication versions of our paper but the referee was in-
sistent that it be taken out if the paper was to be published.
12 Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) would argue that this is
the case.
13 Skinner (2008) puts forward a further test for whether
current accounting procedures have bad effects. He asks
whether capital markets fail to provide the necessary funds to
support high technology firms. In the UK, the stock markets
have adapted to allow the listing of, for example, biotechnol-
ogy firms with no history of profits. As a consequence, there
is no clear-cut evidence that current accounting rules have in-
terfered egregiously in the development of a UK biotechnolo-
gy sector. Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify whether the
correct firms, or the correct number of, firms have been listed.
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is to immediately expense such expenditures, a
treatment not altered by the advent of IAS. There
are no requirements to disclose the amounts of
these expenditures. There is relatively little UK
evidence with respect to the views of analysts,
company accountants, etc., about the accounting
treatment of these expenditures. Nor is there much
UK evidence that can even allude to the value-rel-
evance of these expenditures.
There are two papers, however, that speak, di-
rectly and indirectly, to some of these issues with
respect to advertising activities. First, Gray et al.
(1990) survey the views of chief financial officers
in the UK and the US on the net benefits of volun-
tary disclosure with respect to various items. The
survey was conducted in 1984–1985 and one of the
items considered was advertising expenditures.14
With regard to the voluntary disclosure of adver-
tising expenditures, Gray et al. (1990) state ‘U.K.
financial executives are significantly more worried
about the net costs of providing information on the
amount of advertising expenditure’ relative to their
counterparts in the US. Specifically, UK financial
executives perceive net costs to such disclosures.15
Second, Shah et al. (2008b) provide evidence on
the value relevance of estimates of major media
advertising expenditures. The source of data for
the estimates of advertising expenditures is
ACNielsen MEAL. ACNielsen MEAL are a major
commercial supplier of estimated advertising ex-
penditures, published quarterly. As a consequence,
these estimates are available at a cost to business
and market participants. The estimates are based
upon surveying major media outlets for advertise-
ments associated with products. These advertise-
ments are then multiplied by estimated rates to get
a cost per advertisement. The data is aggregated by
product which can then be further aggregated from
products to product groups to companies.
In testing for the value relevance of ACNielsen
MEAL estimates of major media advertising ex-
penditures, Shah et al. (2008b) extend the model of
Akbar and Stark (2003), as described in equation
(3) above, to include an advertising expenditure
variable.16 As an additional value relevance test,
they examine whether advertising expenditures are
able to help in the prediction of the subsequent
year’s residual income, once other variables are
controlled for (lagged residual income, lagged
R&D expenditures, and lagged book value). Their
conclusions are that major media advertising ex-
penditures are value relevant for non-manufactur-
ing firms, but not for manufacturing firms. They
conclude, with respect to the UK, that their results
‘could be of interest to … policy-makers … be-
cause the results suggest that the provision of
major media advertising information could be use-
ful to market participants, in the sense that esti-
mates of these expenditures can help explain
variations in market values, and help forecast a
measure of earnings, for a class of firms. As a con-
sequence, one element of a case for their disclo-
sure could be brought – some benefits seem to
exist, to offset any associated costs.’17
Summarising, for advertising expenditures that
might give rise to intangible assets, therefore, there
is some evidence that, for a limited class of expen-
ditures (major media), and for a limited set of
firms, they are value-relevant. It is not clear that all
advertising expenditures, even major media, lead
to the acquisition of an intangible asset. As a con-
sequence, there could be a case for the disclosure
of such expenditures, or a class of such expendi-
tures, subject to an assessment of the costs (pro-
prietary and other) of such disclosure.
Nonetheless, given the views previously ex-
pressed by UK financial executives reported in
Gray et al. (1990), there might well be resistance
to such disclosure. It is worth noting in this regard
that, however, judging by the evidence from Hope
and Gray (1982) and Nixon (1997), the views of
industry appeared to have changed over time with
respect to the disclosure of R&D amounts and vol-
untary disclosure. As a consequence, there might
be less resistance now to the disclosure of (certain
types of) advertising expenditures than over 20
years ago.
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14 As pointed out in Shah et al. (2008b), before 1994 ‘the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required indus-
trial and commercial firms to supply a supplementary income
statement information schedule, which contained, as one of its
items, advertising expenses. In 1994, however, the SEC issued
FR44, which eliminated the requirement to furnish this 
schedule. As a consequence, FR44 effectively overturned the
SOP 93-7 requirement for separate disclosure of advertising
expenses for industrial and commercial firms. As a conse-
quence, the disclosure of advertising expense in the US has
been voluntary since 1994 for these firms.’ As a consequence,
it is not totally clear that the disclosure of advertising expen-
diture was voluntary in the US during the period of the survey.
15 Simpson (2008) studies the consequences of the change
in the advertising expenditure disclosure requirements for US
industrial and commercial firms. Her results identify patterns
of voluntary disclosure behaviour in which firms in industries
where advertising expenditures by one firm benefited their ri-
vals before 1994 are less likely to disclose advertising costs
voluntarily after 1994. Also, firms, which experienced valua-
tion benefits from advertising before 1994 are more likely to
voluntarily disclose afterwards. Her results also indicate that
investors in the US markets treat voluntarily disclosed adver-
tising expenses as if they are investment expenditures.
16 They do not include the ‘other information’ variable from
equation (3), however.
17 Kallapur and Kwan (2004) investigate the value rele-
vance of brand assets recognised in UK balance sheets as a
consequence of acquisitions. They find that the recognised
brand assets are value-relevant. Nonetheless, they also provide
evidence that the valuations placed on recognised brand assets
by UK firms are subject to contracting incentives caused not
only by the conventional source of debt contracts but also by
London Stock Exchange rules relating to circumstances under
which UK companies can undertake acquisitions without
seeking the approval of their shareholders.
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4. Accounting policy implications for
recognition and disclosure
Similar to the views of Skinner (2008), there ap-
pears to be little demand, and little evidence, for a
widespread reappraisal of accounting policy with
respect to allowing the capitalising of some or all
of R&D expenditures in the UK. Firm representa-
tives do not believe that there are systematic and
widespread mis-pricing effects for firms with
R&D activities and the empirical evidence sup-
ports this. If anything, the evidence suggests that
IAS standards should be changed to allow the dis-
cretion, previously allowed under SSAP 13, as to
whether or not to capitalise qualifying develop-
ment expenditures. Even there, however, the con-
sequences of disallowing discretion are unlikely to
be large with respect to the efficient operations of
stock markets although, as suggested by Nixon
(1997), there might be some cost implications for
company accountants.
Penman (2006) points out that, for firms in a
steady state (even if growing), the capitalise/amor-
tise versus immediate expensing issue with respect
to expenditures that might give rise to intangible
assets is not automatically of any concern to mar-
ket participants seeking information relevant to
valuing the firm. For such firms, the accounting
treatment (e.g. immediate expensing) of these ex-
penditures does not mislead market participants
into serious forecasting mistakes with respect to
the future potential of firms. Further this idea is
not restricted to expenditures that are disclosed.18
This raises three issues. One is whether the cap-
italise/amortise versus immediate expensing issue
could be an issue for non-steady state firms. The
second is whether, for these firms, there might be
a need to separately disclose expenditures on items
likely to give rise to intangible assets. The third is
whether there are sufficient safeguards in place
with respect to voluntary disclosure to ensure that
such disclosures can be relied upon. If they cannot
be relied upon, as Skinner (2008) suggests, there
could be a role for some kind of regulation by ac-
counting bodies or the state.
For R&D, however, it seems accepted in the UK
that voluntary disclosure outside of financial state-
ments, in addition to the disclosure of R&D ex-
penditures, is necessary in order that stock markets
can put appropriate values on firms’ R&D activi-
ties. One role for the disclosure of the amount of
R&D expenditures could be that it provides a ‘re-
ality check’ on claims made by companies’ man-
agements with respect to the future benefits arising
from such expenditures. Nonetheless, the appro-
priate valuation of R&D expenditures, whether for
firms in a steady state or a non-steady state, in gen-
eral does not seem to require the capitalising and
subsequent amortising of some or all of R&D ex-
penditures.
One would not want to be too sanguine about the
incentives for reliable disclosure, however. In par-
ticular, the UK biotechnology industry has been
the subject of a number of disclosure ‘incidents’ in
recent years.19 Whether such incidents were the re-
sult of deliberate attempts to defraud or an unfor-
tunate degree of over-enthusiasm about future
potential is not clear. Arguably, however, such in-
cidents did give rise to concerns that lead the
BioIndustry Association in the UK to produce 
its ‘Best Practice Guidance on Financial and
Corporate Communications’.20 Presumably, this
move was motivated by potential spillover effects
for the whole industry of disclosure ‘incidents’.
Further, surveying the Regulatory News Service
reveals little evidence of bad news concerning
drug trials which, given the perceived riskiness of
the drug discovery process, could be regarded as
surprising. As a consequence, as Skinner (2008)
suggests, there could be a role for voluntary dis-
closure guidelines.
The situation could be different for other cate-
gories of expenditure, however. As Penman (2006)
indicates, the lack of disclosure of advertising ex-
penditures will not automatically cause difficulties
for the valuation of companies. Nonetheless, the
assumption of firms being in a steady state for
forecasting purposes covers up many implicit as-
sumptions about the built-in relationships between
advertising activities, and their extent, and subse-
quent sales, and their extent. It is difficult to see
how, without the disclosure of advertising expen-
ditures, market participants can assess the realism
of their revenue projections and their dependence
on marketing and advertising activities. Similar ar-
guments could be made, for example, about ex-
penditures on the development of a well-educated
and well-trained work force.
Note, however, that most advertising activities,
by their nature, are not meant to be secret. In other
words, market participants can observe them to
one extent or another, depending upon the good or
service involved. If they cannot, then information
intermediaries such as ACNielsen MEAL can pro-
vide estimates of some types of expenditure at a
cost. As a consequence, it could be argued that
there are alternative, if imperfect and costly, means
of getting information on advertising activities,
282 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
18 As pointed out by Skinner (2008), Penman (2007) illus-
trates this basic point via a valuation case study using Coca-
Cola. He shows that it was perfectly possible to apply
forecasting methods that valued Coca-Cola pretty accurately
despite the fact that advertising expenditures are expensed
and, as a consequence, what is undoubtedly a major intangible
asset is omitted from Coca-Cola’s balance sheet.
19 Joos (2003) suggests that such problems are not unique to
the UK but have also occurred in the USA.
20 http://www.bioindustry.org/biodocuments/BestPractice
Guidance/BestPracticeGuidance.pdf
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and their extent. The market participant does not
necessarily start at ground zero with regards to the
effects of corporate advertising. It is not clear that
this could be said about other categories of expen-
ditures that have the potential to create intangible
assets, however.
Nonetheless, to be set against such arguments in
favour of disclosure are ones that speak to the
exact definition of such activities and, as a conse-
quence, expenditures related to them. Further,
there are also the normal issues of (proprietary)
costs associated with additional disclosure. In the
context of the USA, Simpson (2008) provides evi-
dence on proprietary costs by studying the behav-
iour of firms before and after the SEC dropping the
requirement for the mandatory disclosure of ad-
vertising expenditures in 1994. Her study does
suggest the existence of proprietary costs associat-
ed with levels of competition and competitive
structure in sectors.
In general, Basu and Waymire (2008), Skinner
(2008), Wyatt (2008) and Ittner (2008) emphasise
that the creation of intangible assets in the context
of fairly complex business models and processes.
Further, these business models and processes,
whilst possibly possessing some degree of homo-
geneity within sectors and across sectors, are also
likely to involve considerable degrees of hetero-
geneity. This gives rise to some concern about the
possibilities for the formal regulation of voluntary
disclosure, and the level of detail that could be in-
volved. Could a common regulatory framework,
for example, identify a set of performance indica-
tors that would be relevant for all firms in helping
market participants in understanding the link be-
tween current activities in creating intangible as-
sets and future performance?
There are two aspects to answering this question.
First, does such a set of performance indicators
exist? Second, could regulators identify them? The
evidence surveyed in Ittner (2008) suggests that
(perhaps surprisingly, perhaps not) businesses
have difficulty in identifying such performance in-
dicators themselves. Further, there is no indication
that, for those firms that think they have a firm
handle on performance indicators that help them
implement their business models and processes,
the performance measures are common across
such firms.
These views partially echo the work of Holland
(2001, 2003, 2005) concerning UK company man-
agers and fund managers. The evidence in Holland
(2001, 2003, 2005) suggests that, in particular,
communication between companies and fund
managers about the creation of intangible assets is
difficult, even when taking place in private, regu-
larly scheduled, meetings between a fund manager
and company management. In discussing intangi-
ble assets, these meetings tend to emphasise qual-
itative, rather than quantitative, information. But,
his evidence emphasises that, notwithstanding the
fact that, for example, R&D and advertising activ-
ities can be reflected in firm market values, fund
managers, as major players in the UK stock mar-
ket, do have difficulty in understanding corporate
intangible asset creation processes. This lack of
understanding could give rise to opportunistic be-
haviour.
The evidence suggests answers to both the ques-
tions posed above. First, it is not clear that a set of
performance indicators, relevant for all firms, ex-
ists. As a consequence, sets of performance meas-
ures might well have to be created for individual
sectors and/or business models and processes.
Second, if businesses find it difficult to come up
with appropriate sets of firm-specific measures,
and major shareholders (i.e. fund managers) find it
difficult to understand the value creation process
for intangible assets in individual firms, is it likely
that regulators can somehow do firms’ jobs for
them, in identifying relevant performance indica-
tors, and help ameliorate the communication diffi-
culties between firm managers and major
shareholders? Nonetheless, the lack of understand-
ing of major shareholders concerning the value
creation process for intangible assets could give
rise to opportunistic behaviour.
As a consequence, Skinner’s (2008) suggestion
that the regulatory framework would likely be in
the form of a broad set of guidelines to help busi-
nesses in how to communicate information rele-
vant to the links between various types of
expenditure designed to increase performance in
the future seems sensible. One possibility is that a
‘best practice’ framework for the disclosure of in-
formation concerning intangible assets could oper-
ate within a ‘comply or explain’ mode, as with the
Combined Code.21
Nonetheless, in the UK, the Financial Services
Authority already publishes guidance on the dis-
closure of price sensitive information.22 As a con-
sequence, any such additional guidelines would
have to be incrementally useful relative to the ex-
isting guidance. That such additional guidance
could be useful is indicated by the UK BioIndustry
Association publication referred to above.23 But,
the existence of such sector specific guidance also
provides another benchmark against which broad
regulatory guidelines should add value. Put anoth-
er way, there already exist guidelines in the UK
about the voluntary disclosure of corporate infor-
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 283
21 This point is attributable to William Forbes.
22 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/GU-0796.pdf
23 Further, if a sector shares enough common interests to
create an industry association, there might be incentives to
create sector-specific self-regulation mechanisms with respect
to activities with potential negative spillovers (e.g. overly op-
portunistic disclosures).
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mation, including those produced by industry 
associations. The key question then is – what addi-
tional value added would be provided by a broad
set of guidelines in the UK?
5. Conclusions
It would be difficult, based upon the UK evidence
available, to say that the current combinations of
various (relatively similar) accounting regulations
plus mandatory/voluntary disclosure mechanisms
(including the obligation to disclose price sensitive
information) lead to enormous inefficiencies in the
UK, or elsewhere. Further, and more specifically,
not allowing the capitalisation of many intangibles
does not seem to do inordinate harm. Nonetheless,
there could be a case for the explicit disclosure of
more categories of expenditures involving intangi-
bles to aid in the forecasting of future prospects –
but proprietary costs would need to be explicitly
considered, and the difficulties of definition grap-
pled with.
It is also possible that there is a role for account-
ing policy-makers in regulating, or providing
guidelines on, the voluntary disclosure of informa-
tion about expenditures and their association with
future prospects. Nonetheless, expenditures on in-
tangibles are thought to be intertwined with busi-
ness models and processes that produce difficulties
in identifying particular items of financial or non-
financial information that are unequivocally asso-
ciated with future performance the disclosure of
which, as a consequence, could be useful to in-
vestors and would not involve ‘excessive’ propri-
etary costs. As a consequence, regulating what
ought to be disclosed concerning intangibles
would be difficult. At best, there could be a role for
regulators in establishing frameworks to guide
voluntary disclosures, as opposed to specifying the
content of such disclosures.
One difficulty in developing such guidelines in
the UK, however, is that such guidelines already
exist, whether through the Financial Services
Authority or industry associations. As a conse-
quence, further guidelines would have to consider
what is to be added to the already existing ones.
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